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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

open to possible interference by a foreign Power in the internal and mili-
tary affairs of Poland and introduces the factor of the Russian policy, i.e.,
the Communist Party, into Polish life." Finally,, the * Council * agreed
to the postponement of the frontier question as being part of the plans
for a general peace settlement.
But, as it was to transpire, the author of the Memorandum was over-
optimistic in expecting the Kremlin to agree to undertake democratic
elections in the country which the Red Army was occupying, or allow the
Polish people to settle their affairs alone. The  Council of National
Unity ' in Warsaw was also far from reality in expecting the United States
and Britain to guarantee any status quo on the Vistula or that Moscow,
blinded with success, would agree to such an action. Although the affair
was handled under adverse conditions the * Council' sent its reply as
requested. When, however, they had more opportunity to study the
Memorandum at greater length, they found it to be completely inad-
missable. The Government Delegate (Vice-Premier) and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Home Army expressed their opinion that the Memorandum
meant nothing less than capitulation, since every important political move
was exclusively dependent on the good-will of the Soviets, without any
question of a guarantee from either the Allies or Moscow. Therefore,
the  Council of National Unity' declared the Memorandum to be in-
compatible with Polish sovereignty and independence.
" In such an important moment for Poland's future," wired the Under-
ground Army's Commander-in-Cliief, " I think it is my duty to express in
the name of the Home Army which I command and doubtlessly in agree-
ment with the opinion of the Polish people, that Poland has not made enor-
mous sacrifices and fought the Germans for five years in order to capitulate
to Russia. When Warsaw began the fight a month ago, a fight which has
been continued with a meaningless help from the outside world, it was not
in order that our Government should give way under pressure of circum-
stances, and force upon our people a submission to a prevalence, a submis-
sion which history would condemn.
" By our fight against Germany, we have proved that we are able to
express our determined will to be free, for we love freedom more than life
itself. If it is necessary, we shall repeat this in defiance of the whole world,
and we shall fight all who endeavour to destroy our freedom."
The Council of National Unity added that, " the agreement with the
Soviets should not be concluded in such a way as to allow England and the
United States to assume that they were thereby released from their guar-
antees and promises which they had given to Poland."
Despite the restrictions added to the Memorandum in Warsaw, the
document was forwarded by Mikolajczyk to Moscow, London and
Washington. Stalin, however, was little concerned with plans formulated
in London and, as Toss stated, " transferred this document to the ' Polish
Committee of National Liberation 5 since the problems raised in it can
only be settled by the Poles themselves."
Thus Poland's status, her independence and her sovereignty, had been
levelled by Moscow to a constitutional conflict between two" groups of
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